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a b s t r a c t
In contexts where healthcare regulation is weak and levels of uncertainty high, how do patients decide
whom and what to trust? In this paper, we explore the potential for using Signalling Theory (ST, a form of
Behavioural Game Theory) to investigate health-related trust problems under conditions of uncertainty,
using the empirical example of ‘herbal clinics’ in Ghana and Tanzania. Qualitative, ethnographic ﬁeld-
work was conducted over an eight-month period (2015e2016) in eight herbal clinics in Ghana and ten in
Tanzania, including semi-structured interviews with herbalists (N ¼ 18) and patients (N ¼ 68), plus
detailed ethnographic observations and twenty additional key informant interviews. The data were used
to explore four ST-derived predictions, relating to herbalists' strategic communication (‘signalling’) of
their trustworthiness to patients, and patients' interpretation of those signals. Signalling Theory is shown
to provide a useful analytical framework, allowing us to go beyond the primary trust problem addressed
by other researchers e cataloguing observable indicators of trustworthiness e and providing tools for
tackling the trickier secondary trust problem, where the trustworthiness of those indicators must be
ascertained. Signalling Theory also enables a basis for comparative work between different empirical
contexts that share the underlying condition of uncertainty.
© 2017 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
1. Introduction
1.1. Healthcare and the problem of trust
Across low/middle-income countries (LMICs), a combination of
weak health systems and high demand leads many people to resort
to a poorly-regulated ‘informal’ sector with substantial uncertainty
about the quality of treatments on offer. Patients are thus faced
with the problem of whom and what to trust. Trust usually implies
vulnerability, since the truster has to depend on, but can never be
certain about, another's motives, intentions and future actions
(Baier, 1994; Gilson et al., 2005). With healthcare, the stakes are
particularly high: individuals' health can be severely compromised
by taking harmful products, while poor quality or ineffective
treatment can be equally dangerous when it delays effective care
and/or undermines trust in healthcare more generally (Blair et al.,
2017).
The role of trust in healthcare has received signiﬁcant research
attention in recent years. Most work has focussed on doctor-patient
relationships in ‘Western’ settings (e.g. Brown, 2009; Calnan and
Rowe, 2008; Barrett et al., 2007; Mechanic and Meyer, 2000;
Meyer, 2015), but research has increasingly included resource-
poor contexts, where inadequate service provision and ﬁnancial
barriers may severely constrain choice (e.g. Birungi, 1998; Gilson
et al., 2005; Russell, 2005; Ozawa and Walker, 2011; Tibandebage
and Mackintish, 2005; Ackatia-Armah et al., 2016; Rodriguez,
2016). These studies have identiﬁed various inter-personal factors
(honesty, sincerity, empathy, evidence of competence, etc.) and
institutional factors (trust in medical training, general trust in
public institutions, etc.) that interact to promote trust and inﬂuence
treatment-seeking decisions.
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However, this literature suffers two important limitations. First,
it assumes that it is intrinsically a good thing for patients to trust
practitioners, as the basis for effective care. Thus, papers often
conclude with recommendations that health professionals hone
their listening/communication skills, etc. to foster patient trust (e.g.
Ackatia-Armah et al., 2016; Gilson, 2003; Mechanic and Meyer,
2000). This is ﬁne if the practitioner really is trustworthy but, in
the highly unregulated informal sector present in many LMICs, this
cannot necessarily be assumed. If behaviours that engender trust
can be taught and learned, it follows that they can also bemimicked.
This leads to the second shortcoming: current literature tends to be
limited to describing and classifying qualities associated with
trustworthiness (competence, integrity, empathy, etc.) and, some-
times, the observable indicators of those qualities (making eye
contact, smiling, listening, etc.). However, given the risk of fakery,
how can patients determine which indicators can be trusted?
In this paper, we propose that Signalling Theory e a variant of
Behavioural Game Theory e might provide a valuable tool for
enabling a deeper and more theoretically-informed analysis of
health-related trust problems. Signalling Theory, whose origins lie
in economics (Akerlof, 1970; Spence, 1973: Podolny, 2005) and
evolutionary biology (Zahavi and Zahavi, 1997), has more recently
been used by biological anthropologists (Bliege Bird and Smith,
2005; Sosis and Alcorta, 2003) and sociologists (Bacharach and
Gambetta, 2003; Gambetta and Hamill, 2005; Gambetta, 2009;
Hamill, 2011) to understand how communication works under
conditions of uncertainty. However, Game Theory has rarely been
applied to healthcare (see Tarrant et al., 2010; for a notable
exception) and, to our knowledge, Signalling Theory has never been
used for this purpose. Below, we outline, and then apply, the
principles of Signalling Theory to a scenario where uncertainty is
particularly high: ‘herbal clinics’ in Ghana and Tanzania. Our aim is
twofold: to address an empirical question e how, under conditions
of uncertainty and informational asymmetry, patients come to
trust/distrust herbalists and their medicines e and to assess the
potential contribution of Signalling Theory to the study of health-
related trust problems more widely.
We use the terms ‘trust’ and ‘trustworthiness’ here in a very
speciﬁc way. When we say that a patient ‘trusts’ a practitioner or
medicine, we mean that they trust enough to accept a speciﬁc
treatment at a particular moment; not necessarily that they trust
the practitioner/medicine more generally. Neither do we assume
that trust is the only factor driving treatment-seeking decisions,
especially in populations facing serious resource constraints, as we
discuss below.
1.2. Signalling Theory
Signalling theory (ST) addresses the problem of how individuals
communicate unobservable properties like trustworthiness to one
another in contexts of uncertainty and asymmetrical information.
Because trustworthiness (like honesty or courage) cannot be
directly observed, we have to discern it through associated
behaviour or ‘signals’. The primary trust problem is to ascertain an
individual's trustworthiness by looking for observable indicators of
that ‘property’. However, as noted above, some peoplee ‘mimics’e
may display the same signals, in order to dupe someone else to
their advantage. The secondary trust problem is thus to determine
whether the signals of trustworthiness can themselves be trusted.
To distinguish between genuinely trustworthy individuals and
‘mimics’, the receiver (the one ‘reading’ the signals) must try to
evaluate the cost of signal production (resources, time, etc.) relative
to expected pay-offs for the signaller. ST distinguishes three cate-
gories of signals according to their discriminatory power. Pooling
signals can be displayed easily and cheaply by genuine and
dishonest signallers alike (for example, smiling) so cannot distin-
guish effectively between the two. Semi-sorting signals carry
greater costs for dishonest signallers, who are therefore less likely
to display them than honest ones. Semi-sorting signals thus convey
more information about trustworthiness, although theymay still be
faked by an imposter who anticipates a sufﬁcient pay-off to justify
the investment. Fully discriminating signals distinguish reliably
between honest and dishonest signallers because they would be
beyond the latter's capacity to mimic, given the expected pay-off
(Spence, 1973; Gambetta, 2009). Gambetta and Hamill (2005)
have noted that, in ‘real life’, the situation is usually better repre-
sented by continuum of signals that convey varying degrees of
imperfect information, operating both singly and in clusters.
Although ST predicts that signalling strategies everywhere draw
on a similar underlying logic, the signals themselves will be
context-speciﬁc. A behaviour that signals trustworthiness in one
context may signify something different (or nothing at all) in
another. A signal's discriminatory power also varies over time, as
once-discriminating practices become easier to mimic and are
more widely adopted. Actors therefore need relevant, up-to-date
knowledge regarding the costs and pay-offs of signals used in a
particular context (Gambetta and Hamill, 2005:14). Trustworthi-
ness is also situation-speciﬁc: you may trust a healer to prescribe
appropriate medicine but not to look after your children, or to treat
a headache but not cancer.
1.3. Applying Signalling Theory to the case of ‘herbal clinics’ in
Ghana and Tanzania
Herbal clinics have become an increasingly prominent feature of
Africa's therapeutic landscapes, especially in urban areas. Operated
usually by men, they claim to combine the best of ‘indigenous’
healing with ‘modern’, ‘scientiﬁc’ approaches, positioning them-
selves strategically within highly-competitive markets. Herbal
clinics in contemporary Ghana and Tanzania range from large, up-
market, ‘high-tech’ establishments to basic, single-room structures
(see Marsland, 2007, Hsu, 2002; McMillen, 2004; Langwick, 2010 re
Tanzania, and Hampshire and Owusu, 2013; Tsey, 1997; Twumasi
and Warren, 1986; re Ghana). Nonetheless, ‘herbal clinics’ share
some common features which form the basis of our working deﬁ-
nition: a ﬁxed premises; operated by a practitioner claiming
expertise in ‘traditional’ herbal medicine; producing and selling
manufactured, plant-derived capsules, powders, ointments and/or
bottled medicines.
Formal regulation of herbal medicine remains limited in both
countries, despite numerous efforts. Since 1992, all herbal products
sold in Ghana require approval by the Food and Drugs Authority
(FDA), which tests products for acute toxicity (although not efﬁcacy
or chronic toxicity, as we discuss below), while practitioners must
be licensed by the statutory Traditional Medicine Practice Council.
However, off the record, regulators complained that they lack the
capacity to operate effectively beyond the capital city; most herbal
medicines remain unapproved and inspections are reportedly
intermittent. Regulation in Tanzania is, as one Government ofﬁcial
put it, “way behind Ghana.” The recently-established Traditional
and Alternative Health Practice Council recently began the
mammoth task of registering all ‘traditional healers’ in the country,
while plans to license herbal medicines have yet to be
operationalised.
In the absence of effective regulation, objective evidence about
the quality and effectiveness of herbal products is limited, but we
can infer substantial variation. Recent in-vivo and in-vitro studies
in Ghana (e.g. Amoah et al., 2015; Komlaga et al., 2016; Wilmost
et al., 2017) and Tanzania (e.g. Nondo et al., 2016) have detected
varying levels of antimicrobial activity and efﬁcacy in commonly-
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marketed herbal medicines. Even less is known about possible
harmful effects of herbal medicines, especially chronic toxicity.
Under these conditions, we would predict, based on Signalling
Theory, that:
1) Herbalists operating clinics will use a range of signals to
communicate their trustworthiness to patients.
2) The costliness and reliability of signals will vary, from uninfor-
mative pooling signals (easily displayed by both high- and low-
quality herbalists) through semi-sorting signals (more costly
for lower-quality herbalists given expected pay-offs) to
discriminating signals (only displayed by high-quality
herbalists).
3) Patients will interpret the reliability of signals according to their
knowledge/beliefs about their costs (monetary outlays, invest-
ment of time, effort, etc.) and pay-offs (principally ﬁnancial
gain) for the herbalist.
4) Over time, some signals will lose their discriminatory power,
and new signals will emerge.
2. Fieldwork and methods
This study draws on qualitative, ethnographic data: a relatively
new departure in ST research (see Sosis and Alcorta, 2003;
Gambetta and Hamill, 2005; Gambetta, 2009; Hamill, 2011;
Vaughan, 2009), which tends to rely on statistical modelling. We
argue that a qualitative, ethnographic approach is essential to un-
derstanding the situation-speciﬁc nature of signalling practices,
where context is crucial and underlying motivations are rarely
discernible from standardised research instruments.
The work underpinning this paper began in 2009e10, when KH
undertook ethnographic research in four herbal clinics in Cape
Coast, an important provincial centre in southern Ghana
(Hampshire and Owusu, 2013). This work provided the basis to
develop a series of ST-derived predictions, which guided a more
formal set of observations and interviews conducted (2015e16) in
eight herbal clinics in Cape Coast and ten in Mwanza: a major
regional centre in North-West Tanzania. All but one of the herbal-
ists (in Ghana) were men.
In both towns, we (authors plus research assistants) conducted
ﬁeldwork in every herbal clinic that we could identify. In each
clinic, the researchers spent 2e3 days conducting detailed obser-
vations, alongside semi-structured interviews with the herbalist
and patients. As each new patient entered, the researcher intro-
duced herself, explained the research protocol, and requested
consent to conduct an interview following their consultation with
the herbalist. The vast majority of patients (more than 90%) agreed
to this and were interviewed in a quiet corner of the clinic. Business
was often slow, and the number of patients interviewed per clinic
ranges from zero to twelve: altogether, 35 patients were inter-
viewed in Cape Coast and 33 in Mwanza: Table 1.
Interviews with herbalists and patients were semi-structured
and wide-ranging. Researchers used standardised interview
guides, arranged around key topics with associated prompts and
probes. Patient interview topics included: contextual/background
information; the relative importance of trust in decision-making;
signal reading and interpretation; signal reliability and trustwor-
thiness [Online ﬁle A]; previous experience and learning over time.
Herbalist interview guides followed a similar format, but focussed
more on signal production and perceptions of patient interpretation
[Online ﬁle B]. Although, understandably, some patients were
anxious not to be delayed for too long, most people were eager to
share their experiences, generating a rich dataset. Additionally,
twenty key informant interviews were conducted in the capital
cities with individuals selected according to their relevance to the
research topic: regulators, herbalists' associations, and relevant
private/voluntary sectors organisations. Interviewswere conducted
in English or local languages, according to interviewees’
preferences.
Detailed hand-written notes were made during each interview
and were typed up, along with observational ﬁeld-notes, at the end
of each day, with all materials translated into English for analysis.
Two of the authors independently andmanually coded all materials
thematically. A series of deductive codes was created, based on the
four ST-derived predictions; these included (inter alia) ‘real’ and
perceived signal costs and pay-offs; knowledge/perception of signal
reliability; and perceived relationships between signals and un-
derlying ‘properties’. Inductive coding was performed simulta-
neously, based on the principles of Grounded Theory (Strauss and
Corbin, 1998), whereby theoretical insights emerge from the data
rather than being pre-speciﬁed. Inductive codes that did not derive
a priori from Signalling Theory were determined through close
reading and re-reading of transcripts.
Two caveats should be noted. First, because patients were con-
tacted at herbal clinics, the sample excluded anyone who
completely rejected this form of medicine. This approach is justi-
ﬁable because our interest is in how patients choose between
clinics, rather than why they utilise this particular sector. Second,
because our 2015-16 study involved all herbal clinics identiﬁed in
each city, this includes the three previously studied in Cape Coast;
the sites where predictions were made and further investigated are
therefore not fully independent.
Ethical approval was granted by Durham University's Anthro-
pology Ethics Committee (UK); Oxford University's Social Sciences
&Humanities Inter-Divisional Research Ethics Committee (UK); the
Tanzanian National Institute for Medical Research (Lake Zone
Institutional Review Board); and the University of Cape Coast
Institutional Review Board (Ghana). All names have been changed
and some other details modiﬁed to protect conﬁdentiality.
3. Results and interpretation
3.1. Consulting a herbal clinic: risk and uncertainty
The patients we interviewed were diverse with regard to
gender, age and socio-economic/educational background, although
women and younger adults were in the majority: Table 1. They
sought treatment for many different kinds of conditions, especially
chronic complaints for which biomedical treatment is widely
believed to be inadequate: infertility, ‘sexual weakness’, menstrual
‘irregularities’, haemorrhoids, chronic pain and fatigue, ‘diabetes’,
‘stroke’ and ‘pressure’ [hypertension]. Almost all had previously
sought biomedical treatment; many had also tried other therapies
(including other herbal clinics). Some were generally favourably
disposed to herbal medicine and came full of hope; others arrived
reluctantly as a last resort. Herbal clinics charged from US$2e3 up
to $75 or more per visit e a signiﬁcant ﬁnancial outlay for many
patients.
Given our sampling strategy, all interviewees believed (or
Table 1
Herbal clinic patient sample.
Age group Ghana Tanzania Totals
Female Male Female Male
20-39y 10 9 17 6 42
40-59y 6 3 6 3 18
60 þ y 5 2 0 1 8
Totals 21 14 23 10 68
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hoped) that some herbalists were well-intentioned and able to give
effective treatment. However, it was widely recognised that not all
could be trusted. Some were just out to ‘do business’ as many in-
terviewees put it, with little interest in patients' wellbeing. In
Tanzania, fears were heightened by recent high-proﬁle media
exposes of fraudulent practitioners. Operating in this context of
high uncertainty, the stakes for patients are high: choosing the
wrong healer could result in continuing or even worsening ill-
health, while many could ill-afford further unsuccessful treat-
ment. There was also much at stake for the herbalists. A successful
clinic could be very lucrative but, with intense competition and
regulatory pressures, many struggled to make a decent living and
going out of business was a real threat.
According to Signalling Theory, this combination of high un-
certainty and intense competition should lead to proliﬁc and
differentiated signalling: the predictions to which we now turn.
3.2. Signals of trustworthiness (primary trust problem)
Patient interviews indicated the importance of ﬁnding a herb-
alist whom they could trust to be technically competent and to act
with integrity (in the patient's best interests). As we discuss below,
trust was not the only consideration for patients, especially those
who were very ﬁnancially constrained and/or desperate. For most,
however, technical competence and integrity were important
qualities in a healer, a ﬁnding congruent with other studies (Gilson,
2003; Gilson et al., 2005; Tibandebage and Mackintish, 2005;
Tarrant et al., 2010; Russell, 2005; Mechanic and Meyer, 2000;
Gopichandran and Chetlapalli, 2013).
However, neither competence nor integrity is directly observ-
able, so patients have instead to look for signs associatedwith these
properties. According to the interview data, technical competence
was indicated by: knowledgeability; a ‘modern’, ‘scientiﬁc’
approach; traditional healing ‘pedigree’; general popularity and
track record; third-party validation; and the healer's conﬁdence in
his own abilities. Honesty, empathy, a caring manner and religious
observance were seen to be indicative of integrity (Table 2). How-
ever, while these signs are somewhat less abstract than their un-
derlying properties, they are also not easily observable and must
therefore be communicated by more deliberately displayed and
visible signals.
Our ﬁrst prediction e that herbalists will use a range of signals
to communicate their trustworthiness to patients e is clearly
supported by the data. Table 2 lists the main signals identiﬁed in
both settings, which operate across different distances as patients
ﬁrst make the decision to travel to a clinic, then to step inside, and
to proceed with treatment. Some refer to the individual herbalist;
others to the clinic (although in practice the two were often
conﬂated by patients). Notably, despite some contextual differ-
ences, the signals displayed are remarkably similar in both
countries.
To take one example, SH's clinic in Cape Coast resembles a
‘modern’ biomedical facility. Patients enter a smart reception area
where a receptionist measures their blood pressure, recording the
details on a computer. After sitting in the waiting room, adorned
with anatomical diagrams and shelves of medicine bottles (all FDA-
approved and labelled with indications, contraindications, dosage
and expiry dates), patients enter a consultation room to see the
‘doctor’, dressed in a white coat and wearing a stethoscope.
Accreditation certiﬁcates hang on the walls, alongside pictures of
Jesus and shelves with more medicine bottles (these ones unla-
belled). At the back of the room, behind a curtain, is an examination
couch. On a large desk sits a ‘Quantum Magnetic Resonance Analy-
ser’: an impressive-looking (but not clinically-validated) device that
purports to produce vast amounts of clinical information, from
‘cholesterol levels’ to ‘reproductive function’, based on a non-
invasive procedure of holding a pulsating electronic probe linked
to a computer [Fig. 1].
SH holds no medical qualiﬁcation but is always addressed as
‘doctor’; he also uses the designation ‘phytotherapist’, while his
website describes him as an ‘AfricanTraditional Healer, descendant of
a long line of Botanists, Herbalists, and Traditional Healers for many
generations’. Likemany Ghanaian herbalists, SH has a regular slot on
several local radio stations, where he discusses various conditions,
and responds to questions from the presenter and listeners, who
also call in to testify to his skills.
There are lots of signals operating here, indicating expert
knowledge, pedigree, accreditation from trusted third parties,
religious observance, etc. Observational and interview data indicate
that these signalse and those in other herbal clinicse are not there
by chance; they are deliberately and strategically deployed to
convince patients of the herbalist's trustworthiness in the face of
intense competition. SH is currently investing in tiling and air-
conditioning, “so that people feel really good when they walk in,”
he explains. “If they see me so neat and the environment clean, they
will easily accept whatever I recommend to them.” This was a com-
mon strategy in both countries; for example, DM (Tanzania) had set
up his clinic to “look like a modern hospital so patients are
impressed”. Patients were, indeed, impressed: several of DM's pa-
tients commented that his ‘advanced clinic’ resembled a hospital;
an inference also made by patients in Ghana:
“The place looks like a proper hospital: out-patients, pharmacy, lab,
consulting room, nurses in proper attire. I am hoping that their
medicine will be nice and heal fast like the clinic and services are
nice.” [48y woman, LK clinic]
SH also invests considerable effort in his radio performances,
making careful preparations in advance: ‘So when people hear me
speak, they respect me because I know what I'm doing. […] they are all
impressed.” Likewise, KW (another Ghanaian herbalist) told us:
“People have heard me speaking well on radio […] Questions are
put to me and I answer them. The answers inform people about
what you are doing, how you do it and it will ultimately attract
them. […] When I explain things on air, the type of diseases that I
cure, their symptoms, when they are convinced, they will come.”
KW's patients are indeed convinced by this display of knowl-
edge: “When I heard him on the radio, and how he was explaining
things and the assurance he gave out, I was convinced that he would
be able to solve my problems,” said one [45y woman], while another
was persuaded by KW's empathic manner: “The doctor was patient
and explained things clearly, so I thought he would be patient and have
time to listen” [33y woman]. Patient testimonials from unknown
callers were particularly compelling for many; one of NS's patients
explained: “On the radio, he spoke about so many sicknesses he could
cure if you come to see him. […] Afterwards, they brought the phones
lines out and people phoned in to testify to how he had healed them
and that convinced me.” [35y man].
Herbalists were adept at tailoring their signals to respond to
patients' concerns and interpretations. For example, in both
countries, there was widespread suspicion of healers who over-
claimed their abilities. Such healers are thought to lack integrity,
placing proﬁt before patients' interests; as one interviewee in
Tanzania explained, “If a herbalist claims to be able to treat every-
thing, it's a sign that he's a fake. A genuine herbalist will advise you to
go to someone else if he can't heal you,” [35y woman]. Knowing this,
herbalists were careful to acknowledge the limits of their expertise,
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referring patients to hospital if there were unsure. Likewise,
charging too much was widely associated with lack of integrity.
‘Genuine’ healers, it was argued, were not out to make big money,
so “many of the fake herbalists are those who demand a lot of money,”
as one Tanzanian patient [25y woman] claimed. On the other hand,
patients also distrusted medicines that were ‘too cheap’. “If you are
selling this medicine at a low price I will be suspicious, it may be
fraudulent,” reasoned one Ghanaian patient [23yman]. Oneway out
of this quandary was to charge relatively high prices for medicines
but offer free diagnosis and consultation, a strategy that was well-
received by many patients: “Here, the diagnosis and advice is offered
free, so they are not just after money,” said a Tanzanian interviewee
[30y woman].
Some herbalists adapted their signalling strategies according to
the audience, treading a careful pathway between different aspects
of their practice. SH, for example, is aware that for some of his
patients e particularly older ones, who have grown up relying on
‘traditional’ herbalists (dunsinyi) and possession priests (okomfo) e
the ‘spiritual’ aspects of herbal medicine are very important. When
interacting with such patients, he conveys this ‘spiritual’ dimension
Fig. 1. Quantum magnetic resonance analyser.
Table 2
Signs and signals used by herbalists and clinics to convey properties of trustworthiness: competence and integrity.
Sign Signal
Modern/scientiﬁc approach  High-tech equipment/machines
 Biomedical pictures/diagrams
 ‘Hospital-like’ clinic appearance
 Clean/‘hygienic’ setting
 Well-packaged medicines, labelled with dosages, expiry dates, etc.
 Computerised patient records
 Business cards
 Use of titles (‘Dr’, ‘phytotherapist’, etc.)
 Referring patients for biomedical diagnostic tests
 Smart attire, white clinical coat
 Use of scientiﬁc/biomedical language in consultations, websites, *radio, etc.
Traditional healing pedigree/expertise  ‘Traditional healer’ paraphernalia/dress
 Display of roots, leaves, bark, etc.
 Medicines in ‘traditional’ unlabelled containers
 *Claims on websites and radio
Knowledgeability  Sounding knowledgeable/convincing on *radio and in consultations.
Quality of medicine production/ingredients  Medicines produced in ‘proper factory’
 Medicine is relatively expensive
 ‘Natural’ ingredients
Popularity  Large clinic with large waiting area
 Busy/full clinic
 Long-standing business
 Widely-recognised brand
 Medicines widely sold in other outlets.
Track record  Personal experience
 Testimony of known/trusted others
 General reputation within and beyond local community
 *Testimony from unknown others on radio, website, etc.
 Long-standing business
Third-party validation  Display of certiﬁcates (accreditation, qualiﬁcation), etc.
 Medicines bearing ofﬁcial (FDA) accreditation.
 Referrals from biomedical clinicians.
 Prominent on high-proﬁle media
Virtue, honesty, putting patients' interests ﬁrst  Not charging ‘too much’.
 Not over-claiming capabilities; referring patients elsewhere.
 Church attendance
 Praying with patients
 Display of religious symbols
 Virtuous lifestyle (no adultery, drunkenness, etc.)
Empathy  Caring/empathetic manner with patients.
 *Sounding caring/empathetic on radio.
 Follow-up with patients post-treatment
Healer's self-belief  *Sounding convincing and conﬁdent on *radio and face-to-face.
 Giving medicine on credit (payment on results).
 High ﬁnancial investment.
[*Ghana only].
Source: patient interview data. To be included, an item had to be mentioned by at least one patient interviewee.
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through, for example, reciting certain incantations and/or blowing
on the medicines to invoke the assistance of the local ‘gods’; he also
dispenses the medicines in large, unlabelled plastic bottles “which
is what they think they should get from a dunsinyi”, he explains. By
contrast, younger, urban, well-educated patients tend to be scep-
tical of ‘spiritual’ connotations. Their trust is built on the fact that
processed herbal medicines “are clean, have dosage and expiry date,
and are certiﬁed by the Food and Drugs Authority,” as one young
woman [23y] in SH's clinic put it. In such cases, SH emphasises the
‘modern’, ‘scientiﬁc’ aspects of his work, deliberately distancing
himself from more ‘spiritual’ practices. This positioning is also
important vis-a-vis the powerful Pentecostal and Charismatic
churches, who vehemently oppose ‘indigenous’ medical practices
that smack of idolatry (Meyer, 1998).
3.3. The trustworthiness of signals (secondary trust problem)
Having described the primary trust problem e how signals of
trustworthiness are displayed by herbalists and ‘read’ by patients e
we now turn to the trickier secondary trust problem: given the
possibility of fakery, how can patients determine which signals to
trust? According to ST, a signal's trustworthiness depends on the
relative costs and pay-offs of its production/display for genuine
versus dishonest signallers. Costs comprise monetary outlays plus
time, effort, etc. They include both known, up-front costs (e.g.
premises rental or business registration) and potential costs
together with the risk of incurring them (e.g. the chances of being
caught selling unregistered medicine and possible penalties: ﬁnes,
reputational damage, etc.). Pay-offs are what a herbalist can expect
to gain (i.e. money; also perhaps less tangible things like satisfac-
tion), again with varying degrees of certainty.
In line with our second prediction, the signals described above
vary substantially in their costs and pay-offs, with some herbalists
deliberately investing in more discriminating signals to differen-
tiate themselves from less trustworthy practitioners. Towards the
‘pooling’ end, we can identify several ‘cheap’ signals that are easily
manufactured, reproduced and displayed by both honest and
dishonest herbalists at minimal cost. They demand little time in-
vestment, no third-party validation, with little/no sanction for
dishonest signalling. The title ‘Doctor’ (or ‘phytotherapist’) is easily
adopted and rarely challenged. Wearing a white coat or adorning a
website with ‘scientiﬁc terminology’ is not difﬁcult; neither is
producing labels for medicine bottles with putative dosages and
expiry dates, praying with patients, or displaying anatomical dia-
grams and/or religious imagery.
More discriminating signals require greater investment of time
and/or resources that would only be worthwhile if a herbalist could
expect substantial returns through a successful business. The lack
of guaranteed return and/or existence of sanctions for dishonest
use might deter an incompetent or disingenuous healer from
investing in displaying such signals. For example, EL, a Ghanaian
herbalist, deliberately used expensive embossed packaging for his
medicines, which could only be purchased in bulk (50,000 pack-
ages at a time, costing GHS 50,000 [$12,500]), reasoning that,
“Those that copy cannot afford to do this e they make cheap ones
without embossment.” Others spoke in similar ways about major
infrastructural investment.
Other signals towards the discriminating end require validation
from trusted third parties: informal ‘referrals’ from ‘hospital doc-
tors’, personal recommendations from friends and relatives, or
accreditation from highly-trusted authorities. This latter is behind
SH's strategic display of an Ontario Council for Herbal Medicine
membership certiﬁcate, acquired on an extended visit to Canada.
Accreditation in Canada “makes people to trust me” and “adds to my
credibility”, SH explained, because ‘Western countries’ are thought
to be more rigorous in their regulation and less open to corruption
than Ghana.
3.4. Interpreting signal reliability
Our third prediction, that patients will read and interpret signals
according to their knowledge/beliefs about the costs of display, is
also borne out by the data but with important caveats. Most pa-
tients were clearly making such inferences in ways predicted by ST.
For example, costly infrastructure investment was widely inter-
preted as a trustworthy signal because such investment would only
make sense for a herbalist conﬁdent enough in his abilities to
expect a signiﬁcant return. In Tanzania, a patient reasoned that,
“because they have invested a lot, their medicine is more likely to be
good,” [25y woman] while another in Ghana followed a similar
logic: “No fraudulent person who is only after making money will
invest so much in providing a nice place only to dupe people by selling
fake medicine.” [37y man].
Patientsmade similar inferences aboutmedicine packaging; one
Tanzanian interviewee said, “It is difﬁcult [unlikely] to use a lot of
money to package bad medicines well. Those that lack money to
package properly may also skimp on production,” [30y man], while
another told us:
“They have followed correct procedures for packaging medicines,
like sealed bottles to prevent dust. […] Those who have followed
correct procedures for packaging medicines are likely to have fol-
lowed correct procedures for making them.” [35y man]
A similar logic was used by some to reason that only genuine
healers, conﬁdent in their abilities, would offer medicines on credit
(usually in the form of a small up-front fee with the balance paid on
results). As one Tanzanian patient reasoned, a herbalist “wouldn't
do that if he didn't know his medicines are good,” [31y man].
Local reputation was widely regarded as a particularly reliable
indicator of trustworthiness. In signalling terms, this is extremely
difﬁcult to fake: reputation takes a long time to build up but is
quickly shattered if patients are dissatisﬁed. Many people therefore
preferred to consult a local practitioner, whose reputation could
more easily be assessed. As one Tanzanian patient put it, “It is
impossible for a herbalist to have good status in the community if he
doesn't have good medicines,” [45y woman].
In these examples, patients were assessing signalling costs/pay-
offs with reasonable accuracy, but this was not always the case.
Wearing a white coat, displaying certain images or calling oneself
‘doctor’ can be done cheaply and easily by anyone, yet some pa-
tients believed these to be reliable indicators of trustworthiness.
One of KW's patients, for example, wrongly assumed that his use of
the title ‘doctor’ “means he has gone through some training.” [51y
man, Ghana].
To take another example, many interviewees in Ghana believed
that only ‘genuine’ herbalists can sound convincing on the radio.
One patient explained, “It would be difﬁcult e you cannot just talk
about something you don't know. This is a medical issue e if you don't
know, you can't give convincing explanations,” [82y woman]. Many
assume that radio stations vet herbalists, only allowing ‘genuine’
ones to broadcast, but this is not the case: local stations depend
heavily on selling publicity ‘packages’ to herbalists, who pay up-
wards of GHS 400 [$80] per month for a regular slot. Listeners may
be unaware that ‘live’ interviews are in fact highly scripted in
advance, or that endorsements from presenters are an expected
part of the package. A healer with a poor track record might not
want to risk being disparaged live on air in a phone-in show but, in
practice, denunciations never happen, and friends can be roped in
to give positive testimonials.
K. Hampshire et al. / Social Science & Medicine 188 (2017) 109e118114
Many patients also appeared to over-estimate the discrimina-
tory value of Government accreditation; as one Ghanaian inter-
viewee put it, “I don't have the capacity to determine if a herbal
medicine is good or not e it is only the FDA that can do so. Once they
have certiﬁed that it can be sold to the public, that means it is good”
[37y man]. FDA certiﬁcation in Ghana requires signiﬁcant capital
investment: herbalists estimated the cost of registering a single
medicine to be around GHS 2500e3000 ($625e750), including on-
site inspection, testing and certiﬁcation fees and other ‘incidental
costs’. However, beyond that, requirements are fairly minimal.
Medicines are tested only for acute toxicity e not for efﬁcacy as
most patients believe. Moreover, as several herbalists noted, it
would be relatively easy to send the FDA a ‘specially-prepared’
medicine for testing, after which manufacturing standards may
slip. Others spoke darkly about ‘prominent people in the system’who
could, for a fee, ensure medicines passed the tests, while in
Tanzania, we were told that practice certiﬁcates could easily be
faked.
3.5. Informational asymmetries and their consequences
In each of these cases, the mismatch between actual and
perceived signal reliability results from informational asymmetry. In
order for patients to interpret signals ‘correctly’, they need accurate
contextual knowledge. To assess the reliability of an accreditation
certiﬁcate, a patient must know: how to read the certiﬁcate; who
the accrediting agency is and how effective/reputable they are;
what exactly is required for accreditation; how easy/difﬁcult/
expensive it would be to circumvent these processes (e.g. through
bribery); how often/easily/cheaply certiﬁcates are faked; what the
chances are of getting caught for non-compliance; what the con-
sequences are of getting caught (ﬁnancial, reputational, etc.); and
the magnitude of pay-offs, (i.e. expected gains from operating a
herbal clinic with/without ofﬁcial accreditation). In practice, many
patients (especially older ones) are not literate, so cannot even read
the certiﬁcate. Of those who can, very few are likely to have
comprehensive understanding of the procedures involved, let alone
be able to evaluate the costs, risks and pay-offs, as accurately as the
herbalists, who have much more invested in this ﬁeld. Patients
typically therefore over-estimate the costs, and thus reliability, of
this signal: Fig. 2a.
The level of informational asymmetry varies between patients
according to their level of knowledge about a particular ﬁeld
(among other things). To take a different example, in Ghana, several
institutions offer training programmes for herbalists; these range
from a Bachelor's Degree in Herbal Medicine at the highly-
respected Kwame Nkrumah University of Science and Technology
(KNUST), to week-long courses on basic hygiene run by the Tradi-
tional Medicine Practice Council (TMPC), to a proliferation of online
courses with varying degrees of accreditation and quality control.
One Ghanaian Government regulator expressed concern about this
situation, worrying that patients could easily misinterpret a TMPC
short-course certiﬁcate as an indication of comprehensive training.
Patients range from highly-educated professionals, well aware of
the difference between a KNUST Degree and an unaccredited online
course, to those for whom any ‘certiﬁcate’ looks impressive: Fig. 2b.
The consequences of informational asymmetry also vary be-
tween patients according to their personal circumstances and/or
levels of desperation. A patient with few other options and/or who
is desperate may accept a lower level of trust before proceeding
with treatment than one in a less desperate or constrained situa-
tion. Meyer and Ward (2013) have argued that, when levels of risk
and vulnerability are very high, trust loses its relevance in doctor-
patient relationships that instead become characterised by depen-
dence (see also Gilson, 2003). Many interviewees described long,
arduous and often expensive therapeutic quests, ﬁnally coming to a
herbal clinic desperate for relief, ready to try anything that might
help. Such patients might be less discriminating, even perhaps
deliberately ignoring signals that challenge or erode their hope.
One (at KW's clinic in Ghana) said that a desperate patient doesn't
care about appearances or expiry dates e all that matters is getting
better. Likewise, those on minimal incomes cannot afford to be too
choosy; they may have to accept a lower threshold of trust than
someone in a more favourable position. This situation is illustrated
in Fig. 2c, using the ‘white coat’ example. For a patient with a high
trust threshold, the value of the ‘white coat signal’ is too low for
trust to be established. However, someone with a lower trust
threshold may accept the signal, despite its limitations.
A further, very important, consequence of the mismatch be-
tween the ‘real’ discriminatory power of a signal and patients'
perceptions is that herbalists may not need to invest in the most
discriminating signals in order to compete effectively in themarket.
If patients cannot effectively distinguish between mid- and higher-
value signals, why take the time, trouble and expense of investing
in the costliest ones? Certainly, none of the herbalists with whom
we worked seriously contemplated taking the KNUST Degree
because they didn't need to: patients came to them anyway and, as
a signal of competence, an impressive-looking ‘machine’was just as
effective and much cheaper (in time and money) than a degree
certiﬁcate. The upshot of this is a relatively undifferentiated mid-
range herbalist medicine market, whereby the least trustworthy
herbalists (who can only afford to display signals that are widely
recognised as pooling) are weeded out but those who pass this
threshold can remain competitive without over-investing in un-
necessarily costly signals. In other words, herbalists have only to
invest in signals that are costly enough to convince prospective
patients to trust them.
3.6. Signal evolution
Signalling ‘games’ have important temporal dimensions, since
both signallers and receivers engage in multiple interactions over
time, enabling them to develop their knowledge and hone their
strategies. However, unlike some other signalling situations, where
the outcome is ultimately clear to both parties (see, for example,
Gambetta and Hamill's (2005) work on taxi drivers in Belfast and
New York who either were or were not robbed/killed by their
passengers), with healthcare, it is much more difﬁcult to know
unambiguously e even after the event e whether the practitioner
or medicine was, in fact, trustworthy. It is notoriously difﬁcult to
establish clear causal relationships between treatment and clinical
outcome, making it difﬁcult for patients to accumulate accurate
knowledge about signal reliability. Powerful positive and negative
feedback loops between trust and clinical outcome operate via the
placebo and nocebo effects (Arnold et al., 2014). Moreover, many
conditions resolve themselves regardless of (or despite) medical
intervention, and the widespread practice of polypharmacy
(attempting several treatments simultaneously) makes it difﬁcult
to distinguish the effect of each, while widespread beliefs that
divine intervention plays a strong part in healing further compli-
cate the business of ascertaining which herbalists e and therefore
what kinds of signals e were in fact trustworthy.
Patients’ ability to read and interpret signals accurately is also
affected by temporal shifts in the wider ﬁeld. As stated in our ﬁnal
prediction, certain signals may lose their discriminatory power
over time, as they become easier/cheaper to display and more
widely adopted, and new signals of trustworthiness will emerge.
Keeping abreast of these developments can be a signiﬁcant chal-
lenge for patients who, unlike the practitioners, usually only engage
infrequently in this ﬁeld and do not have the same long-term
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incentives to update their knowledge regularly.
Take the example of herbalists' radio broadcasts, which have
become increasingly popular over recent years. In the early days,
when this was a novel forum, it may not have been clear that the
chances of being ‘exposed’ by presenters asking tricky questions or
callers complaining about poor treatment would be minimal. Thus,
perhaps, only herbalists sufﬁciently conﬁdent in their knowledge
and track record would be willing to take the risk of doing a live
phone-in show. Now, herbalists know that the risks are negligible,
providing they have the money to pay for airtime and the conﬁ-
dence to sound convincing. A good radio broadcast can now be
achieved by both competent, empathetic herbalists and by conﬁ-
dent, quick-thinking charlatans, while patients struggle to distin-
guish between the two.
A relatively new signal to emerge is the Quantum Magnetic
Resonance Analyser (QMRA). Back in 2009, these machines were
Fig. 2. Comparing Actual [known by healer] and Perceived [by patient] Signal Reliability.
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unknown; now they are on display in most up-market herbal
clinics in both countries and have become a potent signal of
trustworthiness for patients who don't distinguish them from the
clinically-validated diagnostic technology encountered in hospitals.
As one Tanzanian patient explained, “even when you go to hospital
you ﬁnd doctors using machines to make diagnosis” [32y woman].
Herbalists have been quick to capitalise on this development; as
KW [Ghana] put it, “I have to move with the times […] People believe
the machines more than if you don't have machines.” However, while
widely regarded by patients as a highly-discriminating signal, in
fact, QMRAmachines are not clinically validated; they are relatively
cheap (retailing for around US$200) and easy to use, and are not
subject to any regulatory scrutiny. As these machines become more
and more widely adopted, we would expect their perceived reli-
ability as an indicator of trustworthiness to diminish and for other
signals to emerge. As long as the market remains competitive and
uncertainty remains high, it will continue to make sense for high-
quality herbalists to invest in signals that are discriminating
enough to communicate their trustworthiness to patients.
4. Discussion
We set out both to address an empirical questione howpatients
in Ghana and Tanzania come to trust/distrust herbalists e and to
assess the wider theoretical contribution that Signalling Theory
might make to the study of health-related trust problems. In rela-
tion to the former, our ﬁndings echo those from other studies:
patients were seeking technically-competent, well-intentioned
healers, and were actively reading and interpreting signals that
they believe to be associated with those ‘properties’. While there
were some differences between Ghana and Tanzania in the nature
and degree of regulation, and in some of the strategies adopted by
herbalists (for example, the use of radio broadcasts in Ghana), there
was a remarkable degree of similarity observed between the two
countries.
However, Signalling Theory has enabled us to go beyond
description to formulate theoretically-derived predictions that are
amenable e potentially e to empirical testing. Moreover, it moves
us beyond the primary trust problem addressed by other re-
searcherse cataloguing observable indicators of trustworthiness in
healthcare providers e and provides tools for tackling the trickier
secondary trust problem, where the trustworthiness of those in-
dicators must be ascertained. Signalling Theory also enables a basis
for comparative work between very different empirical contexts
that share the underlying conditions of uncertainty, since we can
hypothesise that what appear to be very locally-speciﬁc practices
might in fact share a common underlying logic.
In practical terms, by giving us a framework for comparing the
actual and perceived reliability of signals, ST might enable more
effective targeting of interventions. To pursue the example illus-
trated in Fig. 2a, the gap between the actual and perceived value of
ofﬁcial accreditation might be addressed in several ways. Carefully-
targeted information campaigns could help raise public awareness
of what accreditation actually entails, thereby lowering the
perceived reliability of the signal. Meanwhile, improving the rigour
of testing and increasing/enforcing penalties for non-compliance
could help raise the signal's real costs and reliability. And of
course, improvements in access to decent, affordable healthcare are
likely to push up patient thresholds of trust (Fig. 2c), thereby nar-
rowing possible windows for discrepancy.
Diminishing the gap between actual and perceived signal reli-
ability should result in a dual beneﬁt: ﬁrst, by enabling individual
patients to make more accurate assessments of herbalists' quality
and, second, by incentivising herbalists to raise their game. As we
have suggested above, as long as patients cannot accurately
distinguish between somemid- and higher-range signals, it will not
make sense (at least in ‘rational choice’ terms) for herbalists to
improve their skills and competence by, for example, embarking on
high-quality training programmes. If patients become more adept
at reading and interpreting signals accurately, the herbalist market
is likely to become more clearly differentiated, with demonstrably
trustworthy/effective herbalists rising to the top rather than being
indistinguishable e as is currently the case e from other, more
mediocre, practitioners.
Of course, ST and other ‘rational choice’ approaches can only
take us so far. Moreover, trust is clearly not the only factor shaping
healer-patient interactions and attendant decision-making.
Resource and infrastructural limitations continue to constrain
health-seeking possibilities for large sectors of the population in
Ghana and Tanzania, and treatment decisions relate also to con-
venience, ideology and personal preference. Medicines have af-
fective and emotional meanings beyond just their instrumental
value (Whyte et al., 2003), and the same has been shown to apply to
trust in healthcare practitioners/institutions (Gilson, 2003; Ackatia-
Armah et al., 2016; Meyer and Ward, 2013). In a recent edited
volume, Broch-Due and Ystanes (2016) have argued persuasively
that the ethnocentric assumptions of Western scholars have
resulted in the privileging of individualistic, calculative models of
trust, obscuring other modalities.
We are broadly in agreement with these arguments. However,
expanding the ways that we think about trust should not preclude
in-depth analysis of particular facets. Wewould not wish to suggest
that all the complexity and nuance of patients-herbalist in-
teractions can be reduced to a series of signal-based transactions.
However, it is clear from our data that herbalists and patients are
engaging signalling practices and that ST gives us some theoretical
purchase in understanding these.
5. Conclusion
Our work suggests that Signalling Theory might usefully be
applied to help understand, make predictions about, and perhaps
begin to address, trust problems in healthcare, especially in LMICs
where levels of uncertainty are high and formal regulationweak. To
achieve this, we identify three key areas for theoretical and
methodological development.
First, we need to work with different kinds of data and models,
challenging and traversing standard disciplinary boundaries. We
argue that much can be gained from combining the rigorous
theoretical models offered by Game Theory with the nuance and
contextual detail enabled by ethnographic enquiry. While this pa-
per has focussed on ethnographic detail, an important next step
could be to collect quantitative data that would enable more pre-
cise plotting of signalling mismatches illustrated in Fig. 2. Some
relevant data could be obtained relatively straightforwardly: for
example, average daily clinic takings or the ofﬁcial costs of regis-
tering a medicine (although not necessarily the ‘unofﬁcial’ costs).
However, other data present far greater challenges: where regula-
tory capacity is weak, record-keeping is often incomplete or non-
existent. We found it nigh-on impossible to obtain reliable data
on failure rates of medicine registration, for example, or the pen-
alties incurred in a given time period for those failing to comply
with requirements. In addition to these practical challenges,
bringing together different kinds of data into a single analytical
framework presents epistemological challenges, which will require
ethnographers and formal Game Theorists to develop new collab-
orative ways of approaching problems.
This collaborative approach will be needed to address the new
theoretical complexities that arise when ST is applied to health-
related trust problems. For example, ST has generally assumed
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that trusting and trustworthiness can be treated as independent
variables: this is clearly not the case with medicines where
powerful feedback loops operate via the placebo and nocebo ef-
fects, respectively bolstering or undermining initial trust positions.
Finally, the herbalist-patient interactions described here are just
one part of a complex, multi-layered set of health-related trust
problems that pertain in uncertain and resource-constrained con-
texts, where actors are obliged to assess not only the trustworthi-
ness of the individual/institution they are dealing with directly but
also that individual's/institution's capacity and willingness to
ensure trustworthiness further up supply chains. To truly appre-
hend the parameters of these ‘referred trust games’ played out at
different scales is a major undertaking indeed.
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